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We link governments’ spending efficiency scores, to sovereign debt assessments made by 
financial markets´, more specifically by three rating agencies (Standard & Poors, Moody´s and 
Fitch). Public efficiency scores are computed via data envelopment analysis. Then, we rely 
notably on ordered response models to estimate the response of sovereign ratings to changes in 
efficiency scores. Covering 34 OECD countries over the period 2007-2018, we find that 
increased public spending efficiency is rewarded by financial markets via higher sovereign debt 
ratings. In addition, higher inflation and government indebtedness lead to sovereign rating 
downgrades, while higher foreign reserves contribute to rating upgrades. 
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Capital markets typically consider fiscal developments, notably governments´ policy 
announcements and their fiscal stance, when asking for higher or lower sovereign yields to buy 
nation´s sovereign debt. This assessment also finds echo in sovereign rating notations made by 
key rating agencies, where downgrades and negative economic outlooks are usually more 
aligned with less sound fiscal policies (see, for instance, Afonso et al., 2011). On the other hand, 
given the context of scarce budgetary resources—an aspect that will become even more relevant 
in the post-Covid19 period since many governments have heavily engaged in counter-cyclical 
policies contributing to record high deficit and debt levels—,special attention is also given to 
the more efficient use of public resources, with better performance and efficiency being the 
outcome preferred/desired by policymakers and, ultimately, by taxpayers (see, notably, Afonso 
et al., 2019). 
In this paper, we contribute to the literature by linking governments´ spending efficiency 
and performance, proxied by efficiency scores, to sovereign debt assessments made by financial 
markets´ participants. More specifically, we consider sovereign ratings notations provided by 
the three main rating agencies: Standard & Poors, Moody´s and Fitch Ratings. Governments´ 
efficiency scores are computed via data envelopment analysis (DEA), while ordered response 
models are employed to estimate the effect of efficiency scores on sovereign ratings throughout 
time. Sample-wise, in our empirical analysis we look at 34 OECD countries over the period 
2007-2016. 
Our key result answers positively to the question in the paper’s title. Indeed, better 
public spending efficiency developments are rewarded by financial markets notably with an 
upgrade of sovereign debt ratings, for all the three main rating agencies covered in the analysis. 
Results are robust to several sensitivity and robustness checks. Moreover, higher inflation and 
government indebtedness lead to sovereign rating downgrades, while higher foreign reserves 
contribute to rating upgrades. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related 
literature. Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 develops the empirical methodology and 
discusses the main results. The last section concludes. 
 
2. Related Literature 
 In this section, we bring together two strands of the literature, one dealing with public 
sector efficiency and another with the study of the determinants of sovereign debt ratings.  
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The relevance of public sector efficiency has been a topic of growing interest in the 
literature (see, for example, the works by Gupta and Verhoeven, 2001; Tanzi and Schuknecht, 
1997, 2000; Afonso et al., 2005). Several studies assess the degree of efficiency of the public 
sector by looking at different sample and time spans but most tend to focus on OCDE and 
European countries (Adam at al., 2011; Dutu and Sicari, 2016; Afonso and Kazemi, 2017; 
Antonelli and de Bonis, 2019). All studies have identified substantial public spending efficiency 
differences between countries and also scope for spending savings, suggesting that government 
spending efficiency could be improved. This typically implies that more public services could 
be provided with the same amount of public resources, or conversely, the same level of public 
resources might be provided with fewer public resources. Hence, fiscal improvements also in 
that respect can be good news towards better financial markets assessments. To explain this 
cross-country efficiency differences, studies have examined factors such as: population, 
education, income level, quality of institutions (property right security and level of corruption), 
quality of the country’s governance level, government size, government´s political orientation, 
voter participation rate, civil service competence (Afonso et al., 2005; Hauner and Kyobe, 2010; 
Antonelli and de Bonis, 2019). More recently, Afonso et al. (2019, 2020) evaluated the role of 
tax structures and tax reforms in explaining cross-country efficiency differences. 
Turning to the relevance of fiscal developments for financial markets assessments, via 
notably changes in sovereign ratings, several studies found support for a relevant link. See, for 
instance, Afonso (2003), with OLS approaches, or Bissoondoyal-Bheenick (2005) with ordered 
probit models.1 In this vein, Afonso et al. (2011) analysed the determinants of sovereign ratings 
by using a linear regression framework and an ordered probit response framework.2 In addition, 
Afonso et al. (2012) reported that logistic and exponential transformations to ratings provide 
little improvement over a linear transformation. They also mentioned that GDP per capita, GDP 
growth, government debt and budget balance had a short-term impact, whereas government 
effectiveness, external debt, foreign reserves and default history influenced ratings in the long-
run. Moreover, Amstad and Packer (2015) used several explanatory variables as proxies for 
fiscal, economic and institutional strength, monetary regime, external position and default 
history and concluded that a small set of factors can largely explain the rating scale. Finally, 
                                                          
1 An OLS regression with a linear transformation of the ratings assumes a constant distance between adjacent 
rating notches. However, ratings represent a qualitative ordinal assessment of a sovereign credit risk, thus the 
distance between two adjacent ratings may not be the same 
2 Instead of assuming a rigid shape of the ratings scale, this model estimates the threshold values between rating 
notches, defining the shape of the ratings curve. 
4 
 
Vu et al. (2017) reported that political risk can contribute to explain rating mismatches in a 
country. 
 
3. Data and Variables 
3.1. Data 
 We gather data from several sources. Data on information from the three main rating 
agencies, Standard & Poors (S&P), Moody´s and Fitch Ratings attributed at 31st December was 
retrieved from Datastream and Bloomberg. This data is available for 100 countries for the 
period 2007-2020.   
 To compute the public sector efficiency scores, we use publicly available data from 
World Economic Forum, World Bank, World Health Organization, IMF World Economic 
Outlook and OECD database. When data was not available for a specific year, we assumed that 
the data was equal to that of the previous year. We compute the efficiency scores for 35 OECD 
countries3 for the period between 2006 and 2017.  
 Data on the set of control variables were also retrieved from the IMF´s World Economic 
Outlook, the World Economic Forum and the World Bank´s World Development Indicators. 
 After merging the rating and efficiency data, we end up with a cross-sectional sample 
of 34 OECD countries and a total number of 408 observations.4 
 
3.2. Variables 
3.2.1. Sovereign Debt Ratings 
 
Our key dependent variables are sovereign debt ratings, which we transform from a 
qualitative to a quantitative scale in order to apply an ordered response model. Indeed, a simple 
linear transformation, implicitly assumes that the difference between any two adjacent 
categories is always equal, while that might not be the case. More specifically, the unobserved 
latent variable 𝑅𝑖𝑡
∗  has a linear form and depends on a set of variables as discussed in the 
previous section with several cut-off points to draw up the boundaries of each rating category, 
and the final rating notation is given by: 
                                                          
3 The 35 OECD countries considered are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. We do not consider Mexico 
because the country is efficient by default, and data heterogeneity is quite important for the country sample 
analysis. When a country is efficient by default it means that it will not appear as peer of any other non-efficient 
country. 









𝐴𝐴𝐴 (𝐴𝑎𝑎)             𝑖𝑓             𝑅𝑖𝑡
∗ > 𝑐20
𝐴𝐴 + (𝐴𝑎1)             𝑖𝑓     𝑐16 > 𝑅𝑖𝑡
∗ > 𝑐19
𝐴𝐴 (𝐴𝑎2)                𝑖𝑓     𝑐15 > 𝑅𝑖𝑡
∗ > 𝑐18
⋮
< 𝐶                           𝑖𝑓      𝑐1 > 𝑅𝑖𝑡
∗
.     (4) 
 
The difference between the cut off points determines a non-linearity in the effect of 
variables (i.e. it might be easier to move from AA to AA+, then the subsequent upgrade to 
AAA). Similarly to Afonso et al. (2011), we group ratings into 21 categories by putting together 
the few observations below C, which are given the value one, while AAA observations receive 
the value 21 (Table 1). 
[Table 1] 
  
In addition to using each rating agency´s assessment separately, we also take three 
aggregate measures. The first, is the result of the simple average across the three agencies 
(Average Ratings, which we have plotted in Figure 1 for illustration purposes). The second uses 
a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to extract the common factor (Ratings PCA). A 
likelihood ratio (LR) test was used ex-ante to examine the “sphericity” case, allowing for 
sampling variability in the correlations. This test comfortably rejected sphericity at the 1 percent 
level. Moreover, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy was equal to 0.79 
suggesting that the use of a factor analysis of the variables is a good idea.5 The first factor 
explains 98 percent of the variance in the standardized data. Given that PCA is based on the 
classical covariance matrix, which is sensitive to outliers, we take a third measure by basing it 
on a robust estimation of the covariance (correlation) matrix. A well suited method is the 
Minimum Covariance Determinant (MCD) that considers all subsets containing h% of the 
observations and estimates the variance of the mean on the data of the subset associated with 
the smallest covariance matrix determinant – we implement Rousseeuw and Van Driessen's 
(1999) algorithm. After re-computing the same indices with the MCD version we obtained 




                                                          
5 This is an index for comparing the magnitudes of the observed correlation coefficients to the magnitudes of the 
partial correlation coefficients. 
6 The correlation coefficient between Ratings_PCA and the MCD-equivalent (hereafter MDCeq) was equal to 99, 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
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3.2.2. Public Sector Efficiency  
 Our variables of interest are the public sector efficiency scores, which we computed 
using data envelopment analysis (DEA).7 This approach compares each observation with an 
optimal outcome. This is a suitable approach for several reasons: first, it does not impose an 
underlying production function; second, it allows deviations from the efficient frontier and it 
examines the efficiency of a country relative to its peers.  Formally, for each country i out of 
35 advanced economies, we consider the following function: 
 
  𝑌𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑋𝑖), 𝑖 = 1,… ,35 (2) 
 
where 𝑌 is the composite output measure (Public Sector Performance, PSP) and 𝑋 is the 
composite input measure (Public Expenditure, PE), namely government spending-to-GDP 
ratio.  
As suggested by Afonso et al. (2005, 2019), we use a set of metrics to construct a 
composite of public sector performance (PSP). PSP is the simple average between opportunity 
and Musgravian indicators. The opportunity indicators evaluate the performance of the 
government in administration, education, health and infrastructure sectors, with equal 
weighting. The Musgravian indicators include three sub-indicators: distribution, stability and 
economic performance, also with equal weighting for the indicators. Accordingly, the 
opportunity and Musgravian indicators result from the average of the measures included in each 
sub-indicator. To ensure a convenient benchmark, each sub-indicator measure is first 
normalized by dividing the value of a specific country by the average of that measure for all the 
countries in the sample.  
 Our input measure, Public Expenditure (PE) is lagged one year and expressed as a 
percentage of GDP in several sectors. More specifically, we consider government consumption, 
expenditure on education, expenditure on health, public investment, transfers and subsidies and 
total expenditure. Each area of government expenditure is equally weighted to compute the 
public expenditure input. Tables A1 and A2 in Appendix A provide additional information on 
the sources and variable construction. Further explanation on the variables construction is 
provided in Afonso et al. (2020). 
 We adopt an output orientated approach, to measure the proportional increase in outputs 
while holding input constant and assume variable-returns to scale (VRS), to account for the fact 
                                                          
7 DEA is a non-parametric frontier methodology, drawing from Farrell’s (1957) seminal work and that was further 
developed by Charnes et al. (1978). Coelli et al. (2002) and Thanassoulis (2001) offer introductions to DEA. 
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that countries might not operate at the optimal scale. The efficiency scores are computed by 





𝑠. 𝑡.  − 𝜑𝑦𝑖 + 𝑌𝜆 ≥ 0 
𝑥𝑖 − 𝑋𝜆 ≥ 0 
𝐼1’𝜆 = 1 
𝜆 ≥  0 
(3) 
 
where 𝑦𝑖 is a column vector of outputs, 𝑥𝑖 is a column vector of inputs, 𝜆 is a vector of constants, 
𝐼1’ is a vector of ones, 𝑋 is the input matrix and 𝑌 is the output matrix.  φ is a scalar showing 
by how much the output of each country could increase. If φ>1, the country is inefficient, and 
if φ =1, the country is on the frontier (i.e., it is efficient) representing the best existing country 
(but not necessarily the best possible). 
 We performed DEA for three different models: baseline model (Model 0) includes only 
one input (PE as percentage of GDP) and one output (PSP); Model 1 uses one input, 
governments’ normalized total spending (PE) and two outputs, the opportunity PSP and the 
“Musgravian” PSP scores; and Model 2 assumes two inputs, governments’ normalized 
spending on opportunity and on “Musgravian” indicators and one output, total PSP scores. 
Detailed results are illustrated on Table B.1, B.2 and B.3 of Appendix B. 
 Table 2 provides a summary of the DEA results for the three models using an output-
oriented assessment. The average output efficiency score is approximately 1.50 for Models 0 
and 1 and 1.16 for Model 3 suggesting that outputs could be increased by approximately 50% 
or 16%.  The output efficiency scores for Models 0 and 1 where somewhat higher and seemed 
to have peaked in the period 2011-2013, and then they decreased.  
Overall, the countries located in the production possibility frontier, hence the more 
efficient ones in terms of government spending are: Switzerland and Korea in 2006, and Chile 




                                                          
8 This is the equivalent envelopment form (see Charnes et al., 1978), using the duality property of the multiplier 
form of the original model. 
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4. Empirical Methodology and Results 
4.1. Methodology 
To estimate the impact of public sector efficiency (𝑃𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡) on credit ratings (𝑅𝑖,𝑡
∗ ), we run 
the following panel regression:  
 
 𝑅𝑖,𝑡
∗ = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑃𝑆?̂?𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑿𝑖,𝑡−1
′ + 𝑖,𝑡 (4) 
 
where the unobserved latent variable 𝑅𝑖𝑡
∗  follows a linear quantitative transformation of the 
qualitative rating scales; 𝛼𝑖 are country-fixed effects capturing unobserved heterogeneity across 
countries, and time-unvarying factors; 𝛿𝑡 are time effects to account for common time trends and 
control for global shocks (such as the global business cycle); 𝑃𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is the time-varying output 
efficiency estimate (see sub-section 3.2.2 for details on the variables construction); 𝑿𝒊𝒕 is a vector 
of credit ratings determinants, lagged one year to reduce reverse causality.9 𝑖,𝑡 is an error term 
satisfying the usual assumptions. Note that the output efficiency scores are higher or equal to 1. 




Following the literature (Cantor and Packer, 1996; Monfort and Mulder, 2000; 
Bissoondoyal-Bheenick, 2005), the vector 𝑿𝒊𝒕 includes the following key determinants of 
sovereign credit ratings (with expected sign in parenthesis): inflation rate (+/-), debt-to-GDP ratio 
(-), foreign reserves (+), term of trade index(+/-).10  
In the context of estimating equation (1) with the type of dependent variable we have – 
sovereign credit ratings –, two econometric approaches are typically employed. One uses linear 
regression methods to a linear numerical representation of the ratings (Afonso, 2003) since the 
OLS application is simple and allows for simple generalizations to panel data settings (Mora, 
2006). The second, following Bissoondoyal-Bheenick (2005), uses ordered response models given 
the fact that ratings are a qualitative ordinal measure and traditional linear estimation techniques 
are not adequate. To treat ordered variables as continuous could cause errors in the inference as 
they are biased even in large samples (Trevino and Thomas, 2001; Bessis, 2002; Hu et al., 2002; 
Bissoondoyal-Bheenick, 2005; Mora, 2006; Depken et al., 2007; Afonso et al., 2011). We use two 
                                                          
9 Similar results obtained using contemporaneous regressors (not reported). 
10 Summary statistics of these variables are provided in Table C1 in the appendix. 
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types of estimators: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with robust standard errors clustered at the 
country level and two ordered models (probit and logit) estimated using maximum likelihood using 
a robust variance-covariance matrix to account for serial correlation.  
 
4.2. Results 
We start our empirical analysis by assessing the standalone (unconditional) link between the 
output level of government spending efficiency (for the baseline Model 0)11 and sovereign ratings. 
The results reported in Table 3 show that better spending efficiency is positively related to higher 
sovereign ratings. This baseline result holds for all the three rating agencies (Moodys, Standard & 
Poors and Fitch), for the average rating, and also for the PCA rating proxy and using alternative 




As a next step, we estimate the initial specification augmented with a set of control variables, 
notably: inflation, terms of trade, the debt-to-GDP ratio, and external reserves. Table 4 reports this 
new set of results again for alternative dependent variables: the three rating agencies, the average 




As expected, the control variables for the determinants of sovereign credit ratings are in line 
with previous literature. Indeed, a higher level of government indebtedness and terms of trade 
translate into downgrades of sovereign rating notations across the three rating agencies. In 
addition, no statistically significant result is available for the inflation rate, while the results for 
foreign reserves appear less obvious. 
Related to our research title question, we continue to find that better public spending 
efficiency contributes to sovereign rating upgrades, notably for the all alternative dependent 
                                                          
11 Recall that Model 0 uses one input, governments’ normalized spending,  and one output, total PSP scores. Table 
C.2 in Appendix C, presents our baseline results using alternative output efficiency measures, namely Model 1 (one 
input and two outputs) and Model 2 (two inputs and one output) and as discussed earlier. We continue to find a positive 
effect of public sectir efficiency on rating in all the models and consideing the alternative dependent variables. 
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variables and considering alternative efficiency scores (for Model 1 and 2)  reported in Appendix 
C , Table C.3. 
Considering that an ordered response model (probit or logit) is also a good alternative fit 
model for the latent variable 𝑅𝑖𝑡
∗ ,  we report in Table 5 such results. In Table 5, we can see that the 
statistical significance of the several determinants of rating is kept, and now an increase in foreign 
reserves improves sovereign ratings. In addition, the effect of the output spending efficiency score 
continues to be positive and statistically significant. This main result is also captured for alternative 




Another valid conclusion is that the estimated magnitude of the efficiency score is lower in 
the ordered estimations than it was in the linear panel estimation. Overall, these results hint to the 
possibility that movements up and down the ratings scale can indeed be non-linear. As an aside 
comment, and since the thresholds are mostly all statistically significant that suggests that the 
cutting points are truly different and therefore there is no need to combine the levels of the (ordinal 
rating) dependent variable. 
At this point, it is also important to address an important issue, the endogeneity of the 
efficiency score variable. We estimated specification (1) using OLS and order logit and order 
probit, however, there is a potential bi-directional relationship between the efficiency and rating 
scores. Public sector efficiency may influence the rating scores, but the rating scores may also have 
an impact on public sector performance. For example, the rating scores will affect the sovereign 
yields, which in the end affect government’s fiscal policy and its efficient use of public resources. 
To account for this issue, in our previous analyses, we used the lag efficiency score to explain the 
current rating score.  
Furthermore, we employ an instrumental variable (IV) approach. To instrument for the 
efficiency score variable, we select instruments capturing institutional and political characteristics 
of the countries likely to be correlated to our measure of public sector efficiency but presumably 
not directly related to credit ratings. The main instruments used are those proposed by Acemoglu 
et al. (2019) and Fatas and Mihov (2001, 2013). The first (constraints) captures potential veto 
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points on the decisions of the executive (comes from Henisz, 2000).12 The second (polconv) 
captures not only institutional characteristics in the country but also political outcomes as its value 
is adjusted when, for example, the president and the legislature is member of the same party (comes 
from the Database of Political Institutions). Indeed, as documented by Fatas and Mihov (2013), 
constraints on the executive are likely to reduce spending volatility and positively influence fiscal 
stabilization which is rewarded by credit rating agencies. Table 6 reports the IV estimation results 
of specification (1). 
As previously shown, public sector efficiency is positively related to the average sovereign 
ratings, except for Standard & Poors rating. This main result is also captured for alternative 
efficiency scores (see Table C.6 in Appendix C). For an instrument to be valid the following 
conditions have to be satisfied. First, the instruments need to be correlated with the endogenous 
variables. In Appendix C, Table C.7., we see that this condition is satisfied. Second, the lagged 
values of the instruments should not be strongly correlated with the average rating score, otherwise 
the estimated coefficient would still be biased. To test the relevancy of the instrument, we report 
the Kleibergen-Paap (2016) Wald F statistics. The results are reported on the bottom of Tables 6. 
The rejection of the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistics indicates the validity of the instruments used 
and which has a straightforward interpretation: countries with more constraints on the executive 
do not allow the ruling government to change policy for reasons unrelated to the state of the 
economy. Therefore, in these countries, overall policy volatility is lower which benefits its external 
perception on government bond issuance, lowering its risk (price) and providing rating agencies a 
basis for a positive assessment. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we evaluate the link between government spending efficiency and 
performance and sovereign debt assessments made by financial markets´ participants. More 
specifically we study how sovereign ratings by the three main rating agencies (Standard & Poors, 
Moody´s and Fitch) react to public spending efficiency developments. To compute the public 
efficiency scores, we use data envelopment analysis. Lastly, we rely on linear regression, ordered 
                                                          
12 The role of veto players in policymaking has been studied extensively in the political economy literature. See, for 
example, Tsebelis (2002) for an insightful discussion of the policy effects of veto players. 
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response and instrumental variable models to estimate the reaction of sovereign ratings to 
improvements in efficiency scores. 
For a sample of 34 OECD countries over the period 2007-2018, we find that increased 
public spending efficiency is indeed rewarded by financial markets though higher sovereign credit 
rating notations. In addition, higher inflation and government indebtedness reduce the quality of 
the sovereign credit rating, while higher foreign reserves contribute to rating upgrades. Moreover, 
our results are robust to several sensitivity and robustness checks. 
Therefore, a relevant policy implication from our work is the fact that we do have a positive 
answer to the title question of the paper. In other words, and in the context of fewer public 
resources, and a strong demand for public services, financial markets will reward better more 
efficient governments. This is paramount since higher sovereign credit ratings will naturally imply 
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Table 1. Qualitative Credit Ratings Linear Transformation to Ordinal Scale, by agency 
 
  Ordinal 
scale 
S&P Moody’s Fitch 
Highest quality 21 AAA Aaa AAA 
High quality 
20 AA+ Aa1 AA+ 
19 AA Aa2 AA 
18 AA- Aa3 AA- 
Strong payment 
capacity 
17 A+ A1 A+ 
16 A A2 A 
15 A- A3 A- 
Adequate payment 
capacity 
14 BBB+ Baa1 BBB+ 
13 BBB Baa2 BBB 
12 BBB- Baa3 BBB- 
Likely to fulfil 
obligations, ongoing 
uncertainty 
11 BB+ Ba1 BB+ 
10 BB Ba2 BB 
9 BB- Ba3 BB- 
High credit risk 
8 B+ B1 B+ 
7 B B2 B 
6 B- B3 B- 
Very high credit risk 
5 CCC+ Caa1 CCC+ 
4 CCC Caa2 CCC 
3 CCC- Caa4 CCC- 
Near default with 
possibility of recovery 
2 CC Ca CC 
1 C C C 
















Table 2. Summary of DEA results (output efficiency scores) 
 
    2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Model 0 Efficient 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 2 2 
 































 Average 1.19 1.22 1.43 1.34 1.49 1.59 2.39 2.05 1.34 1.44 1.30 1.37 
 Median 1.17 1.18 1.33 1.34 1.41 1.51 2.20 1.95 1.33 1.42 1.26 1.35 
 Min 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 Max 1.52 1.62 3.40 1.63 2.56 3.69 6.12 5.18 2.13 2.25 1.91 1.92 
  Stdev 0.13 0.16 0.51 0.17 0.35 0.47 1.16 0.83 0.25 0.27 0.21 0.19 






































 Average 1.18 1.21 1.43 1.33 1.49 1.58 2.37 2.04 1.33 1.43 1.30 1.37 
 Median 1.17 1.18 1.31 1.33 1.39 1.51 2.20 1.95 1.33 1.41 1.26 1.35 
 Min 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 Max 1.52 1.62 3.33 1.63 2.56 3.69 6.12 5.18 2.13 2.25 1.91 1.92 
  Stdev 0.13 0.15 0.50 0.17 0.35 0.47 1.18 0.83 0.26 0.28 0.21 0.19 

















































 Average 1.14 1.15 1.16 1.17 1.16 1.16 1.16 1.16 1.16 1.17 1.18 1.17 
 Median 1.10 1.12 1.11 1.11 1.13 1.12 1.11 1.11 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.14 
 Min 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 Max 1.47 1.49 1.48 1.43 1.41 1.43 1.42 1.46 1.45 1.42 1.46 1.44 
  Stdev 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.13 





Table 3. Unconditional regression on alternative rating variables 
 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable  Moodys SP Fitch Average Rating Rating PCA 
PSE_0 (t-1) 8.238*** 6.831*** 6.578*** 7.215*** 1.430*** 
 (1.252) (0.936) (0.912) (1.000) (0.198) 
Constant 15.082*** 15.372*** 16.325*** 15.593*** 0.123 
 (1.123) (0.839) (0.826) (0.894) (0.177) 
Country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 406 406 406 406 406 
R-squared 0.850 0.893 0.886 0.884 0.885 
 
Note: standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 




Table 4. Conditional regression on alternative rating variables 
 Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable 




PSE_0 (t-1) 4.045*** 3.989*** 3.526*** 3.853*** 0.764*** 
 (0.880) (0.713) (0.603) (0.679) (0.134) 
Inflation (t-1) -0.050 -0.077 -0.047 -0.058 -0.011 
 (0.055) (0.057) (0.046) (0.047) (0.009) 
Terms of trade index (t-1) -0.017 -0.018 -0.027** -0.021* -0.004* 
 (0.016) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.002) 
Debt ratio (t-1) -0.092*** -0.064*** -0.070*** -0.075*** -0.015*** 
 (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.001) 
Ln(Reserves) (t-1) -0.421*** -0.569*** -0.379*** -0.456*** -0.091*** 
 (0.157) (0.121) (0.120) (0.126) (0.025) 
Constant 38.309*** 39.131*** 36.788*** 38.076*** 4.583*** 
 (4.566) (3.392) (3.504) (3.621) (0.717) 
Country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 406 406 406 406 406 
R-squared 0.909 0.931 0.930 0.932 0.932 
 
Note: standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, 












Table 5. Conditional robustness regression on alternative dependent rating variables  
 














PSE_0 (t-1) 2.175 *** 3.715 *** PSE_0 (t-1) 2.384 *** 3.989 *** 2.099 *** 3.521 *** 
 (0.397)  (0.682)   (0.395)  (0.683)  (0.396)  (0.676)  
Inflation (t-1) -0.171 *** -0.265 *** Inflation (t-1) -0.183 *** -0.307 *** -0.170 *** -0.279 *** 
 (0.026)  (0.047)   (0.026)  (0.047)  (0.026)  (0.047)  
Terms of trade 
index (t-1) 0.007  0.010  
Terms of trade 
index (t-1) 0.006  0.007  0.003  0.004  
 (0.009)  (0.016)   (0.009)  (0.016)  (0.009)  (0.016)  
Debt ratio (t-1) -0.010 *** -0.015 *** Debt ratio (t-1) -0.010 *** -0.015 *** -0.010 *** -0.015 *** 
 (0.001)  (0.002)   (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)  
Ln(Reserves) (t-1) 0.185 *** 0.308 *** Ln(Reserves) (t-1) 0.147 *** 0.245 *** 0.158 *** 0.257 *** 
  (0.035)   (0.063)     (0.035)   (0.061)   (0.035)   (0.061)   
Cut off 2 1.622  2.478  Cut off 6 0.976  0.700  1.273  1.670  
 (1.219)  (2.160)   (1.172)  (2.099)  (1.146)  (1.938)  
Cut off 3 2.050 * 3.242  Cut off 8 1.613  2.165  1.429  1.985  
 (1.179)  (2.047)   (1.138)  (1.920)  (1.141)  (1.918)  
Cut off 4 2.473 ** 4.009 ** Cut off 9 1.738  2.415  1.559  2.236  
 (1.160)  (1.990)   (1.135)  (1.909)  (1.139)  (1.907)  
Cut off 6 2.606 ** 4.255 ** Cut off 10 1.925 * 2.789  1.674  2.447  
 (1.157)  (1.979)   (1.133)  (1.897)  (1.137)  (1.901)  
Cut off 9 2.718 ** 4.458 ** Cut off 11 2.454 ** 3.807  1.771  2.625  
 (1.156)  (1.972)   (1.127)  (1.874)  (1.135)  (1.896)  
Cut off 10 3.114 *** 5.161 *** Cut off 12 2.807 ** 4.461  2.345  3.671 * 
 (1.150)  (1.957)   (1.124)  (1.867)  (1.130)  (1.880)  
Cut off 11 3.275 *** 5.448 *** Cut off 13 3.251 *** 5.253 ** 2.718  4.347 ** 
 (1.148)  (1.953)   (1.123)  (1.865)  (1.128)  (1.876)  
Cut off 12 3.751 *** 6.299 *** Cut off 14 3.491 *** 5.663 ** 3.008 ** 4.863 *** 
 (1.146)  (1.949)   (1.124)  (1.865)  (1.127)  (1.872)  
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Cut off 13 4.312 *** 7.268 *** Cut off 15 3.704 *** 6.022 *** 3.484 ** 5.681 *** 
 (1.149)  (1.956)   (1.125)  (1.867)  (1.129)  (1.874)  
Cut off 14 4.505 *** 7.594 *** Cut off 16 3.919 *** 6.381 *** 3.820 *** 6.244 *** 
 (1.151)  (1.960)   (1.127)  (1.870)  (1.133)  (1.881)  
Cut off 15 4.722 *** 7.953 *** Cut off 17 4.137 *** 6.741 *** 3.997 *** 6.535 *** 
 (1.153)  (1.964)   (1.129)  (1.873)  (1.135)  (1.884)  
Cut off 16 4.900 *** 8.246 *** Cut off 18 4.466 *** 7.279 *** 4.340 *** 7.094 *** 
 (1.156)  (1.968)   (1.133)  (1.880)  (1.138)  (1.890)  
Cut off 17 5.165 *** 8.678 *** Cut off 19 4.639 *** 7.559 *** 4.603 *** 7.519 *** 
 (1.160)  (1.975)   (1.134)  (1.883)  (1.139)  (1.893)  
Cut off 18 5.533 *** 9.275 *** Cut off 20 4.973 *** 8.104 *** 4.774 *** 7.799 *** 
 (1.164)  (1.982)   (1.136)  (1.888)  (1.139)  (1.894)  
Cut off 19 5.729 *** 9.590 *** Cut off 21 5.238 *** 8.541 *** 4.909 *** 8.021 *** 
 (1.164)  (1.984)   (1.137)  (1.891)  (1.140)  (1.896)  
Cut off 20 5.884 *** 9.842 ***          
 (1.165)  (1.985)           
Cut off 21 6.035 *** 10.090 ***          
 (1.165)  (1.987)           
N 357  357   357  357  357  357  
 














Table 6. Endogeneity robust conditional regression on alternative rating variables 
 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
Dependent Variable  





Rating PCA Rating PCA 
 IV1 IV2 IV1 IV2 IV1 IV2 IV1 IV2 IV1 IV2 
                      
PSE_0 (t-1) 6.075 6.410* 4.158 2.974 4.748* 5.871** 4.993* 5.085** 0.989* 1.006** 
 (4.051) (3.484) (2.678) (2.301) (2.813) (2.448) (2.978) (2.559) (0.589) (0.506) 
Inflation (t-1) 0.027 0.025 0.115* 0.123** 0.076 0.068 0.073 0.072 0.015 0.014 
 (0.094) (0.093) (0.062) (0.061) (0.065) (0.065) (0.069) (0.068) (0.014) (0.014) 
Terms of trade index (t-1) -0.037* -0.037* -0.026* -0.023* -0.032** -0.035** -0.032** -0.032** -0.006** -0.006** 
 (0.021) (0.020) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.003) (0.003) 
Debt ratio (t-1) -0.078*** -0.077*** -0.062*** -0.066*** -0.068*** -0.065*** -0.070*** -0.069*** -0.014*** -0.014*** 
 (0.017) (0.015) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002) 
Ln(Reserves) (t-1) -0.979** -0.976** -0.664** -0.674** -0.381 -0.371 -0.674* -0.674* -0.133* -0.133* 
 (0.480) (0.480) (0.317) (0.317) (0.333) (0.337) (0.353) (0.353) (0.070) (0.070) 
Constant 51.021*** 50.654*** 41.565*** 42.859*** 35.716*** 34.487*** 42.767*** 42.667*** 5.497*** 5.478*** 
 (12.595) (12.405) (8.325) (8.191) (8.747) (8.714) (9.258) (9.112) (1.831) (1.802) 
                      
Country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 163 163 163 163 163 163 163 163 163 163 
R-squared 0.918 0.918 0.957 0.957 0.951 0.950 0.949 0.949 0.949 0.949 
Kleibergen-Paap F-
statistics 6.728 4.659 6.728 4.659 6.728 4.659 6.728 4.659 6.728 4.659 
 
 
Note: standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. Country and time fixed effects included but omitted for 








Figure 1 – Simple average of sovereign ratings (Moody’s, S&P, Fitch) 




































































































































































































































































Table A1: DEA Output Components 
 
Sub Index  Variable  Source  Series 
Opportunity 
Indicators 
      
Administration  Corruption  Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 
(2006- 2017) 
Corruption on a scale from 10 (Perceived to have low 
levels of corruption) to 0 (highly corrupt), 2006-2011; 
Corruption on a scale from 100 (Perceived to have low 
levels of corruption) to 0 (highly corrupt), 2012-2017.  
Red Tape  World Economic Forum:  The Global 
competitiveness Report (2006-2017) 
Burden of government regulation on a scale from 7 (not 
burdensome at all) to 1 (extremely burdensome).  
Judicial 
Independence 
World Economic Forum:  The Global 
competitiveness Report (2006-2017) 
Judicial independence on a scale from 7 (entirely 
independent) to 1 (heavily influenced).  
Property Rights  World Economic Forum:  The Global 
competitiveness Report (2006-2017) 
Property rights on a scale from 7 (very strong) to 1 (very 
weak). 
  Shadow Economy Schneider (2016) (2006-2016)13 Shadow economy measured as percentage of official 
GDP. Reciprocal value 1/x.  
Education Secondary School 
Enrolment  
World Bank, World Development 
Indicators (2006-2017) 





World Economic Forum:  The Global 
competitiveness Report (2006-2017) 
Quality of educational system on a scale from 7 (very 
well) to 1 (not well at all). 
  PISA scores PISA Report (2003, 2006, 2009, 
2012, 2015) 
Simple average of mathematics, reading and science 
scores for the years 2015, 2012, 2009; Simple average of 
mathematics and reading for the year 2003. For the 
missing years, we assumed that the scores were the same 
as in the previous years. 
Health Infant Survival 
Rate 
World Bank, World Development 
Indicators (2006-2017) 
Infant survival rate = (1000-IMR)/1000. IMR is the 
infant mortality rate measured per 1000 lives birth in a 
given year.  
Life Expectancy  World Bank, World Development 
Indicators (2006-2017) 
Life expectancy at birth, measured in years. 
  CVD, cancer, 
diabetes or CRD 
Survival Rate 
World Health Organization, Global 
Health Observatory Data Repository 
(2000, 2005, 2010, 2015, 2016) 
CVD, cancer and diabetes survival rate =100-M. M is 
the mortality rate between the ages 30 and 70. For the 
missing years, we assumed that the scores were the same 





World Economic Forum:  The Global 
competitiveness Report (2006-2017) 
Infrastructure quality on a scale from 7 (extensive and 
efficient) to 1 (extremely underdeveloped) 
 
Standard Musgravian Indicators  
  
Distribution  Gini Index  Eurostat, OECD (2006-2016)14 Gini index on a scale from 1(perfect inequality) to 0 
(perfect equality). Transformed to 1-Gini. 
Stabilization  Coefficient of 
Variation of 
Growth  
IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO 
database) (2006-2017) 
Coefficient of variation=standard deviation/mean of 
GDP growth based on 5 year data. GDP constant prices 
(percent change). Reciprocal value 1/x. 
  Standard Deviation 
of Inflation 
IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO 
database) (2006-2017) 
Standard deviation of inflation based on 5-year 




GDP per Capita IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO 
database) (2006-2017) 
GDP per capita based on PPP, current international 
dollar.  
GDP Growth  IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO 
database) (2006-2017) 
GDP constant prices (percent change). 
  Unemployment  IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO 
database) (2006-2017) 
Unemployment rate, as a percentage of total labor force. 
Reciprocal value 1/x. 
  
                                                          
13 For Chile, Iceland, Israel, South Korea and Mexico, we use the data available in Medina and Schneider (2017). 
14 For Switzerland, we were only able to collect data for the period between 2009 and 2016. 
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Table A2: Input Components 
Sub Index  Variable  Source  Series 
Opportunity 




IMF World Economic 
Outlook (WEO database) 
(2005-2016) 
General government final 
consumption expenditure (% of 




UNESCO Institute for 
Statistics (2005-2016)15 
Expenditure on education (% of 
GDP)  
Health Health Expenditure OECD database (2005-2016) 
Expenditure on health (% of 
GDP)  
Public Infrastructure Public Investment 
European Commission, 
AMECO (2005-2016)16 
General  government gross 
fixed capital formation (% of 
GDP) at current prices 
Standard Musgravian 






Aggregation of the social 







2016)18 Total expenditure (% of GDP)  
                                                          
15 From IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO database), we retrieved data for Greece for the period between 2006 
and 2012 and for the USA for the period 2005 and 2007. 
16 We were not able to collect data on the following countries: Australia, Canada, Mexico, New Zealand, Chile,  Israel 
and South Korea. 
17 From IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO database), we retrieved data for New Zealand for the period 2005 and 
2012. For Turkey, we retrieve data from European Commission, AMECO database. For Chile and Iceland, we were 
only able to collect data for the period between 2013 and 2016. For Turkey, we were only able to get data for the 
period between 2009 and 2015. We were not able to collect data for Canada.  
18 From IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO database), we retrieved data for Canada for the period between 2005 
and 2012 and for New Zealand for the period 2009 and 2012. For Turkey, we retrieve data from European 
Commission, AMECO database. We were not able to collect data for Mexico. For Chile and Iceland, we were only 
able to collect data for the period between 2013 and 2016. For New Zealand, we were only able to collect data for the 
period between 2009 and 2016. For Japan, we were only able to collect data for the period between 2005 and 2016. 
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Appendix B  
 
Table B.1: Output-oriented DEA VRS Efficiency Scores Model 0 
 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
AUS 1.05 1.10 1.06 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.05 1.18 1.10 1.07 
AUT 1.08 1.14 1.11 1.24 1.32 1.39 2.03 1.99 1.29 1.44 1.26 1.36 
BEL 1.22 1.23 1.33 1.38 1.41 1.51 2.20 2.03 1.38 1.50 1.31 1.41 
CAN 1.07 1.14 1.03 1.29 1.32 1.40 1.82 1.65 1.07 1.33 1.14 1.25 
CHE 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.11 1.16 1.23 1.68 1.44 1.00 1.11 1.01 1.15 
CHL 1.15 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
CZE 1.32 1.32 1.24 1.44 1.57 1.70 2.86 2.51 1.46 1.50 1.41 1.41 
DEU 1.21 1.26 1.24 1.31 1.34 1.42 2.06 1.89 1.22 1.37 1.21 1.30 
DNK 1.11 1.15 1.37 1.25 1.39 1.52 2.26 2.01 1.26 1.36 1.23 1.18 
ESP 1.02 1.07 1.31 1.52 1.75 2.01 5.26 5.18 1.70 1.72 1.51 1.62 
EST 1.17 1.24 3.40 1.43 1.82 1.68 2.13 2.25 1.42 1.60 1.38 1.45 
FIN 1.15 1.15 1.29 1.26 1.38 1.47 2.59 2.19 1.41 1.58 1.33 1.39 
FRA 1.06 1.17 1.34 1.37 1.44 1.51 2.25 1.99 1.33 1.48 1.31 1.36 
GBR 1.09 1.15 1.52 1.33 1.45 1.60 2.12 1.89 1.20 1.34 1.20 1.35 
GRC 1.27 1.29 1.64 1.56 2.37 3.69   2.13 2.25 1.91 1.92 
HUN 1.19 1.62 1.65 1.63 1.92 2.04 3.61 2.54 1.55 1.73 1.60 1.50 
IRL 1.16 1.21 2.09 1.48 1.67 1.68 2.69 2.07 1.20 1.00 1.21 1.15 
ISL 1.15 1.10 1.18 1.29 1.72 1.63 2.39 1.91 1.34 1.29 1.09 1.25 
ISR 1.44 1.39 1.23 1.34 1.20 1.19 1.45 1.25 1.29 1.46 1.21 1.30 
ITA 1.32 1.38 1.84 1.61 1.77 2.00 4.95 3.50 1.81 1.97 1.77 1.71 
JPN 1.18 1.03 1.52 1.36 1.39 1.63 2.08 1.76 1.34 1.39 1.24 1.35 
KOR 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.03 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
LTU 1.25 1.27 1.39 1.50 1.94 1.81 2.27 2.23 1.37 1.52 1.36 1.53 
LUX 1.06 1.06 1.37 1.21 1.22 1.37 2.20 1.59 1.12 1.32 1.19 1.27 
LVA 1.20 1.27 3.04 1.56 2.56 1.97 2.49 2.54 1.69 1.62 1.39 1.58 
NLD 1.23 1.13 1.00 1.10 1.24 1.35 2.30 2.14 1.34 1.42 1.29 1.32 
NOR 1.17 1.17 1.27 1.19 1.32 1.40 1.66 1.62 1.15 1.22 1.21 1.25 
NZL 1.18 1.20 1.47 1.24 1.27 1.36 1.61 1.25 1.11 1.29 1.03 1.26 
POL 1.52 1.50 1.21 1.30 1.20 1.11 1.33 1.48 1.48 1.61 1.43 1.50 
PRT 1.45 1.43 1.39 1.58 1.66 2.08 6.12 3.66 1.70 1.79 1.57 1.51 
SVK 1.35 1.38 1.09 1.46 1.51 1.71 2.27 2.31 1.54 1.57 1.43 1.53 
SVN 1.29 1.31 1.14 1.37 1.63 1.83 3.98 2.89 1.50 1.71 1.49 1.51 
SWE 1.16 1.18 1.47 1.28 1.23 1.40 2.25 1.82 1.27 1.23 1.13 1.33 
TUR 1.43 1.57 1.68 1.58 1.44 1.33 1.45 1.32 1.18 1.32 1.38 1.53 
USA 1.13 1.16 1.33 1.40 1.47 1.61 1.94 1.77 1.05 1.22 1.12 1.24 
Count 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 2 2 
Average 1.19 1.22 1.43 1.34 1.49 1.59 2.39 2.05 1.34 1.44 1.30 1.37 
Median 1.17 1.18 1.33 1.34 1.41 1.51 2.20 1.95 1.33 1.42 1.26 1.35 
Min 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Max 1.52 1.62 3.40 1.63 2.56 3.69 6.12 5.18 2.13 2.25 1.91 1.92 





Table B.2: Output-oriented DEA VRS Efficiency Scores Model 1 
 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
AUS 1.02 1.07 1.03 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.02 1.12 1.10 1.07 
AUT 1.08 1.14 1.11 1.24 1.32 1.39 2.03 1.99 1.29 1.44 1.26 1.36 
BEL 1.22 1.23 1.33 1.38 1.41 1.51 2.20 2.03 1.38 1.50 1.31 1.41 
CAN 1.07 1.14 1.03 1.29 1.32 1.40 1.82 1.65 1.07 1.33 1.14 1.25 
CHE 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.10 1.14 1.18 1.64 1.44 1.00 1.07 1.01 1.15 
CHL 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
CZE 1.32 1.32 1.24 1.44 1.57 1.70 2.86 2.51 1.46 1.50 1.41 1.41 
DEU 1.21 1.26 1.24 1.31 1.34 1.42 2.06 1.89 1.22 1.37 1.21 1.30 
DNK 1.11 1.15 1.37 1.25 1.39 1.52 2.26 2.01 1.26 1.36 1.23 1.18 
ESP 1.02 1.07 1.31 1.52 1.75 2.01 5.26 5.18 1.64 1.72 1.51 1.62 
EST 1.14 1.19 3.33 1.43 1.82 1.68 2.13 2.25 1.42 1.55 1.38 1.45 
FIN 1.15 1.15 1.29 1.26 1.38 1.47 2.59 2.19 1.41 1.58 1.33 1.39 
FRA 1.06 1.17 1.34 1.37 1.44 1.51 2.25 1.99 1.33 1.48 1.31 1.36 
GBR 1.03 1.15 1.52 1.33 1.45 1.60 2.12 1.89 1.20 1.34 1.20 1.35 
GRC 1.27 1.29 1.64 1.56 2.37 3.69   2.13 2.25 1.91 1.92 
HUN 1.19 1.62 1.65 1.63 1.92 2.04 3.61 2.54 1.55 1.73 1.60 1.50 
IRL 1.15 1.21 2.09 1.48 1.67 1.68 2.69 2.07 1.18 1.00 1.21 1.15 
ISL 1.15 1.10 1.18 1.29 1.72 1.63 2.39 1.91 1.34 1.26 1.09 1.25 
ISR 1.44 1.39 1.23 1.34 1.19 1.17 1.41 1.25 1.28 1.41 1.21 1.30 
ITA 1.32 1.38 1.84 1.61 1.77 2.00 4.95 3.50 1.81 1.97 1.77 1.71 
JPN 1.17 1.03 1.52 1.33 1.39 1.62 2.08 1.76 1.34 1.39 1.24 1.35 
KOR 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
LTU 1.24 1.25 1.39 1.50 1.94 1.81 2.27 2.18 1.35 1.51 1.36 1.53 
LUX 1.06 1.06 1.37 1.21 1.22 1.37 2.20 1.59 1.10 1.32 1.19 1.27 
LVA 1.19 1.24 2.94 1.53 2.56 1.96 2.49 2.54 1.69 1.57 1.39 1.58 
NLD 1.23 1.13 1.00 1.10 1.24 1.35 2.30 2.14 1.34 1.42 1.29 1.32 
NOR 1.17 1.17 1.27 1.19 1.32 1.40 1.66 1.62 1.15 1.22 1.21 1.25 
NZL 1.17 1.20 1.47 1.24 1.27 1.36 1.61 1.25 1.11 1.23 1.03 1.26 
POL 1.52 1.50 1.21 1.30 1.20 1.11 1.33 1.48 1.48 1.61 1.43 1.50 
PRT 1.45 1.43 1.39 1.58 1.66 2.08 6.12 3.66 1.70 1.79 1.57 1.51 
SVK 1.31 1.37 1.08 1.40 1.51 1.67 2.23 2.25 1.49 1.57 1.43 1.53 
SVN 1.29 1.31 1.14 1.37 1.63 1.83 3.98 2.89 1.50 1.71 1.49 1.51 
SWE 1.16 1.18 1.47 1.28 1.23 1.40 2.25 1.82 1.27 1.23 1.13 1.33 
TUR 1.31 1.44 1.60 1.44 1.37 1.23 1.00 1.22 1.12 1.26 1.38 1.53 
USA 1.04 1.07 1.28 1.35 1.47 1.61 1.94 1.77 1.00 1.09 1.12 1.24 
Count 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 4 3 2 2 
Average 1.18 1.21 1.43 1.33 1.49 1.58 2.37 2.04 1.33 1.43 1.30 1.37 
Median 1.17 1.18 1.31 1.33 1.39 1.51 2.20 1.95 1.33 1.41 1.26 1.35 
Min 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Max 1.52 1.62 3.33 1.63 2.56 3.69 6.12 5.18 2.13 2.25 1.91 1.92 





Table B.3: Output-oriented DEA VRS Efficiency Scores Model 2 
 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
AUS 1.01 1.05 1.05 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.02 1.08 1.09 1.01 
AUT 1.05 1.06 1.05 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.08 1.08 1.09 1.11 1.12 1.14 
BEL 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.14 1.15 1.14 1.14 1.14 1.14 1.16 1.14 1.17 
CAN 1.07 1.08 1.03 1.08 1.07 1.08 1.08 1.09 1.06 1.11 1.12 1.11 
CHE 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
CHL 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
CZE 1.28 1.31 1.21 1.30 1.29 1.28 1.28 1.31 1.31 1.30 1.31 1.27 
DEU 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.09 1.10 1.10 1.09 1.09 1.10 1.10 1.12 1.12 
DNK 1.03 1.03 1.05 1.06 1.06 1.05 1.09 1.11 1.09 1.09 1.10 1.06 
ESP 1.00 1.00 1.24 1.25 1.23 1.22 1.20 1.19 1.21 1.23 1.24 1.25 
EST 1.16 1.23 1.25 1.23 1.21 1.20 1.21 1.21 1.20 1.22 1.21 1.21 
FIN 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.04 1.04 1.03 1.02 1.02 1.03 1.05 1.04 1.04 
FRA 1.06 1.09 1.10 1.11 1.10 1.10 1.11 1.11 1.13 1.14 1.16 1.17 
GBR 1.09 1.12 1.16 1.17 1.15 1.12 1.11 1.11 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.14 
GRC 1.26 1.25 1.38 1.39 1.40 1.41 1.42 1.39 1.38 1.41 1.43 1.44 
HUN 1.18 1.38 1.44 1.42 1.37 1.37 1.37 1.36 1.35 1.40 1.46 1.36 
IRL 1.13 1.19 1.21 1.19 1.19 1.16 1.11 1.11 1.11 1.00 1.00 1.00 
ISL 1.02 1.05 1.06 1.05 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.09 1.10 1.10 1.08 1.11 
ISR 1.20 1.22 1.23 1.27 1.19 1.16 1.17 1.15 1.29 1.28 1.19 1.17 
ITA 1.31 1.35 1.46 1.43 1.41 1.41 1.41 1.34 1.36 1.41 1.40 1.40 
JPN 1.06 1.00 1.09 1.10 1.10 1.09 1.10 1.08 1.07 1.07 1.09 1.10 
KOR 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
LTU 1.24 1.21 1.38 1.36 1.36 1.35 1.33 1.31 1.27 1.24 1.25 1.24 
LUX 1.05 1.03 1.11 1.08 1.07 1.08 1.08 1.07 1.07 1.09 1.11 1.11 
LVA 1.18 1.18 1.43 1.39 1.38 1.39 1.37 1.34 1.32 1.32 1.36 1.35 
NLD 1.06 1.06 1.00 1.03 1.07 1.06 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.03 1.05 1.05 
NOR 1.11 1.12 1.15 1.10 1.14 1.15 1.11 1.12 1.12 1.11 1.14 1.11 
NZL 1.10 1.13 1.15 1.10 1.10 1.09 1.06 1.02 1.07 1.08 1.02 1.10 
POL 1.47 1.49 1.10 1.25 1.13 1.03 1.27 1.30 1.38 1.38 1.39 1.34 
PRT 1.23 1.23 1.25 1.23 1.23 1.22 1.20 1.19 1.18 1.20 1.23 1.21 
SVK 1.34 1.36 1.00 1.36 1.38 1.43 1.42 1.46 1.45 1.42 1.41 1.38 
SVN 1.29 1.29 1.11 1.23 1.25 1.28 1.27 1.29 1.30 1.32 1.33 1.32 
SWE 1.11 1.09 1.09 1.07 1.06 1.07 1.10 1.10 1.13 1.12 1.11 1.11 
TUR 1.42 1.43 1.48 1.41 1.30 1.23 1.20 1.19 1.17 1.22 1.23 1.24 
USA 1.04 1.08 1.09 1.10 1.11 1.12 1.12 1.11 1.02 1.09 1.09 1.07 
Count 3 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 
Average 1.14 1.15 1.16 1.17 1.16 1.16 1.16 1.16 1.16 1.17 1.18 1.17 
Median 1.10 1.12 1.11 1.11 1.13 1.12 1.11 1.11 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.14 
Min 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Max 1.47 1.49 1.48 1.43 1.41 1.43 1.42 1.46 1.45 1.42 1.46 1.44 





Table C.1– Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Dependent Variables    
Moodys 408 17.59 3.98 
SP 408 17.81 3.63 
Fitch 408 17.87 3.5 
Average Rating 408 17.76 3.66 
Rating PCA 408 0.55 0.73 
 
Independent Variables   
PSE_0 (t-1) 406 0.72 0.17 
PSE_1 (t-1) 406 0.73 0.17 
PSE_2 (t-1) 408 0.87 0.09 
Inflation rate (t-1) 408 2.17 2.24 
Terms of trade index (t-1) 408 99.6 7.27 
Debt-to-GDP ratio (t-1) 408 64.80 42.32 
Ln(Foreign reserves) (t-1) 408 23.83 1.77 
Ln(GDP per capita (t-1) 408 4.57 2 
 
Notes: The rating variables are grouped in in 21 categories. The output efficiency scores (PSE) were transformed by 
computing PSE=1/φ and are available for three models (Model 0, 1 and 2).  For Model 0 and 1, Greece’s PSP score 
is negative in 2012 and 2013, therefore we cannot compute its efficiency score for Model 0 and 1.  
 
 
Table C.2 Unconditional regression on alternative rating variables and alternative 
efficiency scores 
 
 Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dependent Variable 
Moodys SP Fitch Average Rating 
Rating 
PCA 
Moodys SP Fitch Average Rating Rating PCA 
PSE_1 (t-1) 7.782*** 6.550*** 6.183*** 6.838*** 1.355***      
 (1.183) (0.875) (0.871) (0.943) (0.187)      
PSE_2 (t-1)      9.894*** 7.047*** 7.224*** 8.055*** 1.594*** 
      (3.116) (2.556) (2.599) (2.707) (0.536) 
Constant 15.215*** 15.393*** 16.459*** 15.689*** 0.142 13.070*** 14.792*** 15.352*** 14.405*** -0.111 
 (1.124) (0.823) (0.835) (0.892) (0.177) (2.909) (2.378) (2.438) (2.526) (0.501) 
Country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 406 406 406 406 406 408 408 408 408 408 
R-squared 0.849 0.892 0.884 0.883 0.884 0.834 0.875 0.871 0.867 0.868 
Note: standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 






Table C.3 Conditional regression on alternative rating variables and alternative efficiency 
scores 
 
 Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dependent Variable 










PSE_1 (t-1) 3.704*** 3.787*** 3.194*** 3.562*** 0.707***      
 (0.821) (0.674) (0.576) (0.639) (0.127)      
PSE_2 (t-1)      4.916*** 3.934** 3.575** 4.142*** 0.820*** 
      (1.705) (1.587) (1.507) (1.513) (0.300) 
Inflation (t-1) -0.047 -0.074 -0.045 -0.056 -0.011 -0.055 -0.078 -0.051 -0.061 -0.012 
 (0.055) (0.058) (0.047) (0.048) (0.009) (0.060) (0.067) (0.052) (0.054) (0.011) 
Terms of trade index (t-1) -0.015 -0.017 -0.026** -0.019+ -0.004+ -0.010 -0.011 -0.021* -0.014 -0.003 
 (0.016) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.002) (0.016) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.002) 
Debt ratio (t-1) -0.093*** -0.064*** -0.070*** -0.076*** -0.015*** -0.100*** -0.073*** -0.077*** -0.083*** -0.017*** 
 (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.001) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.001) 
Ln(Reserves) (t-1) -0.422*** -0.570*** -0.380*** -0.457*** -0.091*** -0.443** -0.582*** -0.393*** -0.473*** -0.094*** 
 (0.158) (0.122) (0.121) (0.127) (0.025) (0.172) (0.131) (0.131) (0.139) (0.027) 
Constant 38.386*** 39.094*** 36.884*** 38.121*** 4.592*** 37.746*** 39.268*** 36.846*** 37.954*** 4.560*** 
 (4.583) (3.425) (3.515) (3.641) (0.721) (4.823) (3.489) (3.783) (3.843) (0.761) 
Country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 406 406 406 406 406 408 408 408 408 408 
R-squared 0.908 0.931 0.929 0.931 0.932 0.908 0.926 0.928 0.929 0.929 
Note: standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
Country and time fixed effects included but omitted for reasons of parsimony. 
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Table C.4 Conditional robustness regression on alternative rating variables and alternative efficiency scores (Model 1) 
 














PSE_1 (t-1) 1.995 *** 3.427 *** PSE_1 (t-1) 2.199 *** 3.665 *** 1.920 *** 3.235 *** 
 (0.391)  (0.672)   (0.389)  (0.670)  (0.390)  (0.666)  
Inflation (t-1) -0.174 *** -0.267 *** Inflation (t-1) -0.187 *** -0.311 *** -0.173 *** -0.282 *** 
 (0.026)  (0.047)   (0.026)  (0.047)  (0.026)  (0.048)  
Terms of trade 
index (t-1) 0.008  0.012  
Terms of trade 
index (t-1) 0.007  0.009  0.004  0.005  
 (0.009)  (0.016)   (0.009)  (0.016)  (0.009)  (0.016)  
Debt ratio (t-1) -0.010 *** -0.015 *** Debt ratio (t-1) -0.010 *** -0.015 *** -0.010 *** -0.015 *** 
 (0.001)  (0.002)   (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)  
Ln(Reserves) (t-1) 0.186 *** 0.310 *** Ln(Reserves) (t-1) 0.147 *** 0.246 *** 0.158 *** 0.259 *** 
  (0.035)   (0.064)     (0.035)   (0.061)   (0.035)   (0.061)   
Cut off 2 1.650  2.518  Cut off 6 1.005  0.739  1.312  1.724  
 (1.219)  (2.158)   (1.172)  (2.099)  (1.146)  (1.936)  
Cut off 3 2.076 * 3.280  Cut off 8 1.640  2.203  1.467  2.038  
 (1.179)  (2.045)   (1.138)  (1.920)  (1.142)  (1.916)  
Cut off 4 2.498 ** 4.046 * Cut off 9 1.765  2.453  1.597  2.289  
 (1.161)  (1.988)   (1.136)  (1.909)  (1.139)  (1.905)  
Cut off 6 2.631 ** 4.292 ** Cut off 10 1.952 * 2.826  1.712  2.500  
 (1.158)  (1.977)   (1.133)  (1.896)  (1.137)  (1.899)  
Cut off 9 2.743 ** 4.495 ** Cut off 11 2.477 ** 3.838  1.809  2.678  
 (1.156)  (1.970)   (1.128)  (1.874)  (1.136)  (1.894)  
Cut off 10 3.137 *** 5.196 *** Cut off 12 2.827 ** 4.485  2.379  3.720 * 
 (1.150)  (1.954)   (1.125)  (1.866)  (1.130)  (1.878)  
Cut off 11 3.297 *** 5.482 *** Cut off 13 3.267 *** 5.273 ** 2.750  4.392 ** 
 (1.148)  (1.951)   (1.124)  (1.864)  (1.129)  (1.874)  
Cut off 12 3.770 *** 6.328 *** Cut off 14 3.504 *** 5.678 ** 3.036 ** 4.904 *** 
 (1.146)  (1.947)   (1.124)  (1.865)  (1.128)  (1.870)  
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Cut off 13 4.325 *** 7.289 *** Cut off 15 3.715 *** 6.032 *** 3.506 ** 5.712 *** 
 (1.150)  (1.954)   (1.125)  (1.866)  (1.129)  (1.872)  
Cut off 14 4.516 *** 7.611 *** Cut off 16 3.927 *** 6.386 *** 3.837 *** 6.268 *** 
 (1.151)  (1.957)   (1.127)  (1.869)  (1.133)  (1.879)  
Cut off 15 4.730 *** 7.966 *** Cut off 17 4.142 *** 6.742 *** 4.012 *** 6.556 *** 
 (1.154)  (1.962)   (1.130)  (1.873)  (1.135)  (1.882)  
Cut off 16 4.906 *** 8.256 *** Cut off 18 4.468 *** 7.274 *** 4.353 *** 7.111 *** 
 (1.156)  (1.966)   (1.133)  (1.879)  (1.138)  (1.888)  
Cut off 17 5.168 *** 8.684 *** Cut off 19 4.639 *** 7.552 *** 4.614 *** 7.535 *** 
 (1.160)  (1.973)   (1.135)  (1.882)  (1.140)  (1.891)  
Cut off 18 5.533 *** 9.275 *** Cut off 20 4.971 *** 8.094 *** 4.785 *** 7.813 *** 
 (1.164)  (1.980)   (1.136)  (1.887)  (1.140)  (1.892)  
Cut off 19 5.727 *** 9.588 *** Cut off 21 5.235 *** 8.528 *** 4.920 *** 8.034 *** 
 (1.165)  (1.982)   (1.137)  (1.890)  (1.140)  (1.894)  
Cut off 20 5.882 *** 9.838 ***          
 (1.165)  (1.983)           
Cut off 21 6.033 *** 10.086 ***          
 (1.165)  (1.984)           
N 357  357   357  357  357  357  
 
 
Note: standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. Country and time fixed effects included but omitted for 






Table C.5 Conditional robustness regression on alternative rating variables and alternative efficiency scores (Model 2) 
 














PSE_2 (t-1) 8.372 *** 15.488 *** PSE_2 (t-1) 9.108 *** 16.307 *** 8.735 *** 15.909 *** 
 (0.725)  (1.409)   (0.739)  (1.405)  (0.729)  (1.414)  
Inflation (t-1) -0.164 *** -0.279 *** Inflation (t-1) -0.182 *** -0.307 *** -0.168 *** -0.284 *** 
 (0.027)  (0.049)   (0.027)  (0.047)  (0.027)  (0.048)  
Terms of trade 
index (t-1) 0.020  0.039  
Terms of trade 
index (t-1) 0.020  0.033  0.014  0.029  
 (0.010)  (0.020)   (0.010)  (0.019)  (0.010)  (0.019)  
Debt ratio (t-1) -0.012 *** -0.020 *** Debt ratio (t-1) -0.012 *** -0.021 *** -0.012 *** -0.020 *** 
 (0.001)  (0.002)   (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)  
Ln(Reserves) (t-1) 0.155 *** 0.254 *** Ln(Reserves) (t-1) 0.116 *** 0.195 *** 0.119 *** 0.192 *** 
  (0.036)   (0.065)     (0.035)   (0.063)   (0.035)  (0.063)   
Cut off 2 7.158 *** 13.286 *** Cut off 6 6.944 *** 11.836 *** 6.698 *** 12.343 *** 
 (1.363)  (2.637)   (1.317)  (2.531)  (1.280)  (2.443)  
Cut off 3 7.588 *** 14.089 *** Cut off 7 7.799 *** 13.637 *** 7.015 *** 12.951 *** 
 (1.330)  (2.553)   (1.282)  (2.390)  (1.274)  (2.426)  
Cut off 4 8.203 *** 15.193 *** Cut off 8 7.928 *** 13.871 *** 7.142 *** 13.180 *** 
 (1.313)  (2.512)   (1.281)  (2.389)  (1.273)  (2.424)  
Cut off 5 8.336 *** 15.426 *** Cut off 9 8.045 *** 14.076 *** 7.258 *** 13.385 *** 
 (1.312)  (2.510)   (1.281)  (2.390)  (1.273)  (2.424)  
Cut off 6 8.455 *** 15.630 *** Cut off 10 8.233 *** 14.410 *** 7.368 *** 13.579 *** 
 (1.312)  (2.510)   (1.280)  (2.391)  (1.273)  (2.427)  
Cut off 9 8.565 *** 15.818 *** Cut off 11 8.774 *** 15.381 *** 7.470 *** 13.754 *** 
 (1.312)  (2.512)   (1.280)  (2.391)  (1.273)  (2.429)  
Cut off 10 8.978 *** 16.519 *** Cut off 12 9.152 *** 16.051 *** 8.067 *** 14.808 *** 
 (1.311)  (2.517)   (1.281)  (2.392)  (1.272)  (2.433)  
Cut off 11 9.153 *** 16.815 *** Cut off 13 9.639 *** 16.897 *** 8.473 *** 15.525 *** 
 (1.311)  (2.518)   (1.284)  (2.398)  (1.273)  (2.437)  
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Cut off 12 9.653 *** 17.682 *** Cut off 14 9.910 *** 17.358 *** 8.815 ** 16.113 *** 
 (1.311)  (2.522)   (1.287)  (2.404)  (1.275)  (2.442)  
Cut off 13 10.225 *** 18.655 *** Cut off 15 10.153 *** 17.768 *** 9.366 *** 17.052 *** 
 (1.316)  (2.533)   (1.291)  (2.411)  (1.282)  (2.457)  
Cut off 14 10.430 *** 19.000 *** Cut off 16 10.397 *** 18.171 *** 9.755 *** 17.698 *** 
 (1.320)  (2.540)   (1.295)  (2.418)  (1.291)  (2.473)  
Cut off 15 10.668 *** 19.400 *** Cut off 17 10.656 *** 18.594 *** 9.967 *** 18.045 *** 
 (1.324)  (2.551)   (1.301)  (2.427)  (1.295)  (2.481)  
Cut off 16 10.868 *** 19.734 *** Cut off 18 11.090 *** 19.309 *** 10.399 *** 18.763 *** 
 (1.329)  (2.560)   (1.311)  (2.445)  (1.303)  (2.496)  
Cut off 17 11.187 *** 20.269 *** Cut off 19 11.330 *** 19.714 *** 10.741 *** 19.349 *** 
 (1.337)  (2.575)   (1.316)  (2.454)  (1.307)  (2.507)  
Cut off 18 11.673 *** 21.091 *** Cut off 20 11.780 *** 20.499 *** 10.965 *** 19.741 *** 
 (1.348)  (2.596)   (1.322)  (2.470)  (1.309)  (2.513)  
Cut off 19 11.927 *** 21.529 *** Cut off 21 12.117 *** 21.091 *** 11.139 *** 20.050  
 (1.352)  (2.604)   (1.325)  (2.481)  (1.310)  (2.518)  
Cut off 20 12.123 *** 21.872 ***          
 (1.354)  (2.614)           
Cut off 21 12.317 *** 22.211 ***          
 (1.354)  (2.614)           
N 357  357   357  357  357  357  
 
Note: standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. Country and time fixed effects included but omitted for 





Table C.6. Endogeneity robust conditional regression on alternative rating variables and alternative efficiency scores (Model 1) 
 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 









Dependent Variable  
 IV1 IV2 IV1 IV2 IV1 IV2 IV1 IV2 IV1 IV2 
            
PSE_1 (t-1) 4.505 4.745* 3.286* 2.366 3.460* 4.291** 3.750* 3.800** 0.743* 0.752** 
 (2.989) (2.579) (1.959) (1.698) (2.072) (1.793) (2.192) (1.891) (0.434) (0.374) 
Inflation (t-1) 0.043 0.042 0.125** 0.130** 0.088 0.084 0.085 0.085 0.017 0.017 
 (0.092) (0.092) (0.060) (0.060) (0.064) (0.064) (0.068) (0.067) (0.013) (0.013) 
Terms of trade index (t-1) -0.031 -0.031 -0.022* -0.021* -0.028** -0.029** -0.027* -0.027* -0.005* -0.005* 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.003) (0.003) 
Debt ratio (t-1) -0.083*** -0.082*** -0.065*** -0.068*** -0.072*** -0.069*** -0.073*** -0.073*** -0.015*** -0.014*** 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002) 
Ln(Reserves) (t-1) -0.994** -0.992** -0.673** -0.680** -0.393 -0.387 -0.687* -0.686* -0.136* -0.136* 
 (0.483) (0.483) (0.317) (0.318) (0.335) (0.336) (0.355) (0.354) (0.070) (0.070) 
Constant 52.328*** 52.044*** 42.220*** 43.309*** 36.809*** 35.826*** 43.786*** 43.726*** 5.699*** 5.687*** 
 (12.405) (12.276) (8.129) (8.083) (8.598) (8.538) (9.099) (9.004) (1.800) (1.781) 
                      
Country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 163 163 163 163 163 163 163 163 163 163 
R-squared 0.917 0.917 0.957 0.957 0.951 0.950 0.948 0.948 0.948 0.948 
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistics 11.85 8.358 11.85 8.358 11.85 8.358 11.85 8.358 11.85 8.358 
Note: standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. Country and time fixed effects included but omitted for 




Table C.7. First stage results of Table 6 
Specification  (1) (2) 
Dependent variable  PSE_0 (t-1) PSE_0 (t-1) 
Regressors\estimation IV1 IV2 
     
constraints (t-1) 0.040** 0.045 
 (0.020) (0.032) 
polconv (t-1) -0.625*** -0.255 
 (0.173) (0.242) 
constraints (t-2)  0.018 
  (0.038) 
polconv (t-2)  -0.537** 
  (0.249) 
Inflation (t-1) 0.009 0.010* 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
Terms of trade index (t-1) 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Debt ratio (t-1) -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Ln(Reserves) (t-1) -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.032) (0.032) 
Constant 1.046 0.997 
 (0.804) (0.799) 
      
Country effects Yes Yes 
Time effects Yes Yes 
Observations 163 163 
Note: standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
Country and time fixed effects included but omitted for reasons of parsimony. 
 
